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1. Defining the «Caput nullitatis» 
By way of introduction, it may be useful to recall the central role 
which the caput nullitatis plays in the initiation, development, and deci-
sion of marriage nullity cases, even to the point of determining in some 
cases the type of process to be followed 1. This is so because the caput 
nullitatis is the «source» of the alleged nullity of marriage consent and 
the goal of the entire process animating it from start to finish. It is there-
fore very important to defme each «source» of nullity clearly and without 
ambiguities, for the certitude to be derived from the process depends on 
it. It is possible, of course, to hear a case under more than one caput 
nullitatis2, for the sources of nullity may overlap, but then greater care 
should be taken to defme each caput clearly, so that the evidence may be 
1. Cfr. CC. 1686,1690. 
2 . Cfr. c. 1677, § 4. 
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gathered and presented in an orderly and logical fashion, and a coherent 
argument may be made. 
In order to define the caput nullitatis clearly and without ambiguity, 
canonical notions and terms should be used, and not those of other spe-
cialized sciences, because the issue to be ultimately judged is marriage 
consent, a juridic act which, endowed with its own juridic elements, 
produces a canonically valid marriage, the juridic effect. If, for instance, 
the caput nullitatis we are considering is impotence, we are interested not 
so much in those clinical notions which brought about this condition, but 
in impotence canonically defined, for the facts defining impotence in 
canonical terms are the «sources» through which the nullity of consent is 
to be proved3. 
The capita nullitatis or «sources» of marriage nullity can be classi-
fied, according to canonical doctrine and the systematic arrangement of 
the Code, as: a) Diriment impediments; b) Lack of canonical form; 
c) Lack of valid consent. Since marriage consent is an act of the will 
formed by proper discernment of the object to be willed, those 
«sources» of nullity classified under «lack of valid consent» may be 
subdivided into: 1) Incapacity to consent (c. 1095); 2) Defects of knowl-
edge (ce. 1096-1099); 3) Defects of the will (ce. 1101-1104). 
The incapacity formulated by canon 1095 is not to be equated with 
that deriving from the impediments4. Impediments are prohibitions ren-
dering the person legally incapable of contracting marriage, while the in-
capacity of canon 1095 is something more radical: it is the canonical 
formulation of a factual incapacity to elicit an act of valid marriage con-
sent. Hence, the title given to this caput nullitatis is consensual inca-
pacity which, implying a dysfunction of the rational faculties, is also 
known as psychological or psychic incapacity. While one may say that 
the actual cause of the incapacity is a pathological condition, the 
«canonical sources» of the nullity of consent is not the pathological 
3. This is not to say that only those cap ita nullitatis defined by positive law and in-
cluded in the Code are to be considered, but that each so urce of nullity must be defined in 
terms that are juridically meaningful. 
4. There continues to be a school of thought holding that the «inability to assume 
the essential obligations» of c. 1095, § 3 has the character of impediment: cfr. GULLO, 
C. in L'incapacitas (can. 1095) nelle «sententiae selectae coram Pinto», Cittli del Va-
ticano, 1988, pp. 40-41. The author cites the sentence Portlandens., c. Pinto, 18, March, 
1971. 
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condition, whatever its clinical denomination and description, but the 
three-fold consensual incapacity canonically defined by canon 1095 as 
«lack of sufficient use of reason», «grave defect of discretion of 
judgement», and «inability to assume the essential obligations». These 
are the capita nullitatis or sources of nullity which ought to be proved, 
while the clínical conditions are the facts, or series of facts, supporting 
the alleged incapacity to consent and to contract marriage. 
When canon 1057, § 2 defines marriage consent as «an act of the 
will», these tenns mean that this juridic act ought to be a free human act 
endowed with proper discernment of the object to be willed. As a human 
act, it must be one elicited by the spiritual powers of the soul and in this 
sense, then, it is not only an act of the will but also an act of the intellect. 
And since the rational powers of the soul depend for their operations on 
the physical senses, marriage consent, as any other human act, is an 
operation of aH the psychophysical systems working in unisono When 
this integration is gravely defective, the external act of consent is no 
longer a free human act endowed with proper discernment of the object 
and able to produce its juridic effect. 
The lack of integration may be due to a psychic dysfunction, to a de-
fect in the actual knowledge of the object, or to a defect in the free choice 
of the object. For this reason, then, those «sources» of nuHity classified 
under «Lack of Valid Consent» are further subdivided into «Consensual 
Incapacity», «Defects of Knowledge» and «Defects of the Will». 
«Consensual Incapacity» can be of three types, as already explained; the 
Defects of Knowledge» are ignorance, error, and fraud; and the «Defects 
of the Will» are fear, force, condition, and simulation. 
While the three types of consensual incapacity describe in canonical 
tenns a de Jacto psychological incapacity to elicit a valid act of marriage 
consent, those capita classified under «Defects of Knowledge» and 
«Defects of the Will» describe a defective exercise of a person's psycho-
logical capacity for marriage consent5. 
5 . A more accurate classification of the 4Canomalies» of marriage consent would be 
this : 1. Consensual Incapacity; 2. Lack o¡ Consent subdivided into A) Ignorance; B) Error: 
a) de ¡acto; b) de iure; C) Simulation; D) Condition; E) Force; 3. Vitiated Consent sub di-
vided into A) Fear; B) Fraud. Cfr. FORNÉS, J., Derecho Matrimonial Canonico, Madrid, 
1990, pp. 103-138. 
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2. «Lack of Due Discretion» 
Many marriage nullity cases are tried, as we know, under the for-
mula of « lack of due discretion», an abbreviated translation of gravi de-
fectu discretionis iudicii of canon 1095, § 2. Because of its widespread 
use, the question has been raised as to whether or not this caput nullitatis 
is properly understood in the actual practice of many tribunals. The 
question is, of course, of great importance, because the entire outcome 
of the canonical process depends on the c1ear definition and under-
standing of the caput nullitatis which animates it from start to finish. 
The term «discretion of judgement», of long scholastic tradition, 
carne into canonicallanguage for the purpose of determining the degree 
of discernment required for valid marriage consent, for it has always 
been evident that besides the power for speculative knowledge con-
cerning the object of marriage consent, an added discernment is needed 
consisting of the power to assess and evaluate the goods implied in a 
particular choice of marriage, and which is naturally acquired with a per-
son's development into adu1thood . 
Before the promulgation of the '83 Code, Rotal jurisprudence 
sought to establish a measure for the «maturity» of judgement required 
for valid marriage consent, and took that measure from that degree of 
discernment or «discretion of judgement» corresponding to a person 
after the completion of puberty (i.e. middle adolescence)6. It followed, 
then, that in those situations where a person was said to be «psycho-
logically immature», Rotal jurisprudence adopted the formula defectus 
discretionis iudicii7 whichlater found its way into canon 1095, § 2. 
After its incorporation into the letter of the law, the «grave defect of dis-
cretion of judgement» has become a legislated caput nullitatis and its 
precise canonical meaning should be derived not only from the literal 
meaning of the terms used, but also from its context within canon 1095, 
6. GULLO, C. (ibid. L'immaturita psico-affettiva ... , p. 95) bluntly but accurately de-
scribes Rotal jurisprudence concerning «irnrnaturity,. as «chao tic,. and the reason, we may 
add, is that the tenn «imrnaturity,. describes an existential human situation but does not de-
fine it. Consequently, it is an ambiguous term and an inadequate concept to serve as caput 
nullitatis. 
7 . Cfr. TEJERO, E., La discreción de juicio para consentir en matrimonio, «Ius 
Canonicum,. (1982), pp. 403-534. 
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as well as from an investigation into the purpose of the law and the 
intention of the legislator8 . . 
The terms «judgement» and «discretion» can be diversely inter-
preted both in Latin and in their modern languages derivatives. Iudicium, 
or judgement, means the power to reason as well as the statement or 
proposition by which that power is exercised. Discretio means both the 
power to discern and its exercise by means of differentiation and distinc-
tion: in both senses it is often used as synonymous with prudence. 
Discretion can refer to the person's discerning power, as in the defectu 
discretio iudicii of canon 1095, § 2, or it can refer to the statement or 
proposition exercising that power, as when we say that a particular act of 
marriage consent lacked due discretion. In our effort to define clearly 
and without ambiguity the caput nullitatis formulated as «grave defect of 
discretion of judgement», we should not confuse the power or capacity 
to discern and differentiate with the actual exercise of that capacity by 
means of particular judgements or propositions. 
Since «discretion of judgement» means ability or power to discern 
particular goods and make particular judgements by differentiating and 
assessing those goods, gravis defectus discretionis iudicii means, rather 
obviously, grave defect of a person's psychological power to make that 
particular judgement which forms the choice of the will. Gravis defectus 
discretionis iudicii does not mean grave error in the act of judging as it is 
sometimes interpreted. 
While a grave defect of the power for discrete discernment con-
cerning the essence of marriage will necessarily result in an inadequate 
particular judgement concerning the same object, the two should not be 
confused. The dysfunction described as a «grave defect of discretion of 
judgement» is the source of the gravely defective «particular judgement» 
which, forming the choice of the will, is an integral part of consent 
itself. But it would be tautological to say that marriage consent, which is 
an exercise of the powers of intellect and will, was substantially defec-
tive (i.e. null) because the exercise of either intellect or will were sub-
stantially defective. Rather, in order to prove that such exercise of intel-
lect and will was inadequate in relatioh to a given object, we ought to 
show that a certain fact or set of facts caused it to be inadequate and, 
8 . Cfr.c.17. 
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consequently, juridically null. That fact or set of facts is the caput nulli-
tatis or source of nullity. 
Consequently, the defective particular judgement is not the so urce of 
nullity of consent and cannot be treated as a procedural caput nullitatis or 
source of nullity of consent, for this source is to be found in those facts 
which caused the particular judgement to be defective, namely the grave 
defect in the power or capacity for discrete judgement (<<grave defect of 
discretion of judgement») or one of those conditions listed under 
«Defects of Knowledge» (ignorance, error, or deceit). 
The «defect of discretion» ought to be «grave», as explicitIy stated 
in canon 1095, § 2. In what refers to human acts, «grave» mean s a de-
parture from the substance of the norm; and if the norm is that a person 
after middle adolescence is able to discern the essentials of marriage, 
«grave» refers to a discernment devoid of such normal power, and this 
means not mere difficulty, which is within normal behavior, but actual 
incapacity, which is abnormal after middle adolescence. 
As explained before, canon 1095 formulates three types of consen-
sual incapacity, each type being a juridically defined caput nullitatis. 
These three types of incapacity are based on the fact that since every 
normal person after reaching adulthood is endowed by nature with the 
mental and emotional capacity to elicit a valid act of marriage consent, 
the absence of such normal psychological capacity implies a dysfunction 
of the rational faculties. These three cap ita do not describe a defective 
exercise of a person's normal psychological make-up by which a per-
son's intellect and will are deceived or frustrated by an element external 
to these faculties, but they describe three types of «psychic incapacity» 
to consent and therefore to contract9 
In 1987 and again in 1988, the Roman Pontiff addressed the Rota 
on the topic of psychological incapacity to contract marriage as regulated 
by canon 109510. Specifically, and for the purpose of this study, the 
9. Failure to understand that the de iure incapacity of canon 1095 is based on a de 
Jacto psychological incapacity is shown by the fact that, in sorne canonical cireles, the 
term «incapacity» is reserved· for the «inability to assume the essential obligations», 
while the «grave defect of discretion of judgement» is thought to describe only a defective 
exercise. 
10. Whether or not these addresses lo the Rota constitute an «authentic» interpreta-
tion according to the prescriptions of c. 16 and tbe formalities of tbe Roman curia is a mat-
ter we need not address in this commentary. It is sufficiently elear, however, tbat, the 
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Holy Father states that «for the canonist, the principIe must remain clear 
that only incapacity, and not difficu1ty, in giving consent and in realizing 
a true community of life and lo ve invalidates a marriage», and he further 
explains that «the hypothesis of real incapacity is to be considered only 
when an anomaly of a serious nature is present which, however it may 
be defined, must substantially vitiate the capacity to understand andlor to 
consent»ll. And in order to prove the existence of an «anomaly of a se-
rious nature» and «the hypothesis of real incapacity» one must defme the 
«concept of normality» which «for the canonist, who is inspired by an 
integrated vision of the person ... , includes moderate forms of psycho-
logical difficulty», for «only the most severe forms of psychic illness 
reach the point of impairing substantially the freedom of the indi-
vidual»12. 
The definitive formulation of canon 1095, the addresses of the 
Roman Pontiff to the Rota, and the Rotal sentences issued since then 
make it very clear that «grave defect of discretion of judgement» means 
incapacity to assess and estimate the values implied in a particular choice 
of marriage. It does not mean simply a defective exercise of an otherwise 
sufficient capacity amounting to «imprudent judgement» or «poor 
judgement»13. 
3. Moral Development and Formation ofvalues 
While the «grave defect of discretion» is an abnormal condition after 
adolescence, implying a dysfunction of the rational faculties, a person 
might act under other conditions which, while not being pathological, 
might still imply a certain «immaturity», or lack of expected development 
leading to the exercise of «imprudent judgement» conceming the choice 
Roman Pontiff is in fact interpreting this canon as the Supreme Legislator who promul-
gated it and as the Supreme Judge explicitly instructing his own tribunal on how to apply it 
(cfr. MARTíN DE AGAR, J.T., L'incapacita consensuale nei recenti discorsi del romano 
Pontefice alla Rota Romana, «Ius EcClesiae», 1982-11, pp. 395-422). 
11. Cfr. JOI-IN P AUL 11, Address to the R. Rota, Febr. 5, 1987, n.7. 
12. Cfr. JOI-IN PAUL n, Address to the R. Rota, Jan. 26, 1988, nn. 5-6. 
13. Cfr. Rotal sentence c. FlORE, May 30, 1987 in «Marriage Studies» IV, 
Washington. D.C., 1990, pp. 14-32; BURKE, R.-GRoCHOLEWSKI, Z.-POMPEDDA, M.-
VERSALDI, G., in «Incapacity for Marriage. Jurisprudence and Interpretation». n Gregorian 
Colloquium, Robert M. Sable, Coordinator and Editor, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 
Rome 1987. 
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of a particular marriage. Obviously, one of the most notable and nonnal 
characteristics of youth is the lack of experience and the habit of acting 
without sufficient reflection conceming sorne very basic things of life. 
This situation of «immaturity» can be aggravated in certain respects by a 
dysfunctional family background and by a culture which promotes self-
gratification as a chief human value to be pursued. Under such cultural 
conditions, a young person will be more inclined to a mistaken discem-
ment or error of judgement conceming the essentials of marriage. But 
then, this is «error» and not «incapacity»: it is an inadequate exercise of 
an otherwise adequate psychological capacity to judge and assume the 
essential rights and obligations of marriage. The «source» of nullity for 
this type of «psychological immaturity» is not «consensual incapacity», 
as fonnulated by canon 1095. If indeed it can be proved that, because of 
those culturally induced conditions, the particular judgement preceding 
the act of consent was gravely defective, the canonical description of 
those conditions will be found in those cap ita classified as «Defects of 
Knowledge». 
The human person during nonnal growth and maturation is moti-
vated to seek a homeostatic level of satisfaction and a sense of self-
esteem which comes through the acceptance and recognition of others 
with whom the person is in contact and actively involved. In the process 
of maturation of personality, the individual fonns a system of values, 
beliefs, expectations, attitudes uniquely organized in the active pursuit of 
the self-ideal. The achievement of a reasonably stable self-concept be-
comes the frame of reference enabling the person to experience a sense 
of security and self-worth. Those habitual attitudes, then, become the 
nonnative frame of reference out of which choices are madel4. 
Obviously, the ego-involvements, sentiments, values, and attitudes 
of the growing and maturing person will be almost totally those of the 
milieu into which the person is bom and raised, namely parents, rela-
tives, friends, schools, the media, church affiliation, socioeconomic 
14. William JAMfs writes of the «self-regarding sentiment», meaning by «senti-
ment» a whole complex of thoughts, feelings and desires. This becomes the «North Star» 
by which one steers one's course in life, a kind of guiding beacon. Hadley Cantril and 
Muzafar Sherif speak of the psychology of «ego-involvement» referring thereby to the 
whole host of varied and multiple relationships witb and in which the developing person 
fmds himself enmeshed. 
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status, political affiliation, and so forth. This process is quite normal, 
healthy and necessary if the person is to function in a secure, com-
fortable, and predictable fashion. It does not preclude the person's free-
dom of choice but it sets the conditions under which that freedom will be 
exercised. For reasons of psychological homeostasis, most people will 
be very strongly motivated by the surrounding and prevailing social 
reinforcers/mores. 
In the formation of values, we should not underestimate the influ-
ence exercised by the visuo-audio media in the individual's desire for 
comformity, acceptance and recognition by peers. And we should ac-
knowledge that in the materialistic culture of «selfism», so continuously 
reinforced by the media, the conditions under which the person is to 
make sorne very important life choices are often inimical to Christian and 
authentic human values. This is not to say that our contemporary culture 
is so corrupted that the individual cannot freely opt for authentic human 
goods, or that the person cannot retain the freedom of choice even under 
opposing social influences. It shows, however, the limits or conditions 
under which human freedom operates in the normal personl5. 
In terms of philosophical psychology, from which the notion of 
«discretion of judgement» is borrowed, the discernment exercised by 
mean s of a judgement concerning the value of a particular choice of 
marriage requires the assessment, evaluation or estimation of «particular 
reason» (vis cogitativa or aestimativa)16 which partially depends for its 
development and maturation on social and educational factors. A person, 
then, raised under a set of values inimical to the true nature of marriage 
will be negatively influenced in that particular judgement which assesses 
the goods involved in a particular marriage. The divorce and contra-
ceptive «mentalities», for example, will necessarily influence in many 
cases a person's appreciation of the value of lasting commitments and 
offspring, and the many facets of the culture of materialism will affect 
also a person's motivations in the particular choice of marriagel7. 
15 . Cfr. JOHN P AUL n, Address to the R. Rota, Jan. 28, 1991 . 
16. Cfr. our article Capaeity and Incapaeity to Contraet Marriage, «Studia Canonic3» 
22 (1988), pp. 147-168; T.A.R.R., 14-11-84, c . PINTo, and GARC(A, L.M ., El grave defecto 
de discreci6n de juicio, in «Ius Canonicum» (1989), pp. 207-241. 
17 . Cfr. COLANTONIO, R., in pp. 22-35 of La Simulazione del Consenso Matrimoniale 
Canonico, «Studi Giuridici» XXII, Cilla del Vaticano, 1990. 
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If those culturally induced conditions and limitations mentioned 
aboye were to gravely affect a person's psychological power to discem 
and assess the goods of marriage, the particular nullity of consent ought 
to be examined under the consensual incapacity formulated in canon 
1095, § 2, but if those influences affected only the correct exercise of the 
same power, the alleged nullity should be that of exclusion of an essen-
tial element of marriage by means of a defective judgement and a defec-
tive choice of the object of consent. While clearly distinguishing it from 
incapacity, the concept of «exclusion» of an essential element has 
evolved in Rotal jurisprudence and in canonicalliterature to apply, not 
only to that explicit «exclusion by a positive act of the will» formulated 
by canon 1101, § 2, and known as « simulation», but also to the implicit 
exclusion of an essential element resulting from pervicax error iuris18• In 
more recent times, and due to the new formulation of error iuris by 
canon 1099 of the revised Code, a distinction can be made between 
explicit error «determining the will» to a «positive act» excluding an 
essential element in the object of consent Cc. 1101, § 2) and implicit error 
«determining the will» to an implicit exclusion of an essential element in 
the object of marriage consent. Since a positive act of the will, as well as 
the very notion of simulation, requires knowledge of what is being 
excluded, «simulation» will be the correct caput nullitatis when proof 
exists that a person knowingly excluded an essential element of marriage 
from the act of consent, but under those conditions we are now 
studying, a person motivated by a wrong system of values will more 
18. Cfr. ibid. BONNET ET AL., La Simulazione del Consenso Matrimoniale Canonico; 
JOHNSON, J.G., Total Simulation in Recent Rotal Jurisprudence, «Studia Canonica» 
1990(2), pp.383-425; SANSON, R.B ., Implied Simulation: Grounds for Annulment?, «The 
Jurisb>, 48 (1988), pp. 747-770 and Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Marital 
Consent, «Monitor Ecc!.», 1988-IV & 1989-1, pp. 415-417. R. B. SANSON seems to be 
searching for the proper caput nullitatis to be applied to those situations where a person, 
showing symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder but not grave enough to make the 
person incapable of assuming the obligations of marriage (c . 1095, § 3), may have con-
tracted marriage with such an ingrained self-centered and egotistic disregard for the rights 
of others, that the person may have implicitly excluded the very substance of the consor-
tium totius vitae, «ordered by its own nature to the good of the spouses, « or another essen-
tial element from the act of consent. The use of the expresion «implicit simulation» to de-
scribe such implicit exclusion sounds rather peculiar. The excluding positive act of the will 
not in conformity with the external and explicit act of consent is always an internal and 
implicit act : simulation, in other words, is always « implicib> by definition . It seems 
more logical, as we argue in the text, to speak of implicit and explicit exclusion. 
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often exclude an essential element of marriage unknowingly, and 
therefore implicitly, by reason of a deep-rooted error in the particular 
judgement which fonns the choice of the will. The correct caput nullitatis 
in this latter case will be error determining the will as we shall now 
explain19. 
4 . Ignorance and Error 
A. Ignorance is lack of knowledge concerning the substance of a 
given object, and error is defective knowledge concerning a particular 
element which, even if essential to the object, does not totally fonn its 
substance. While ignorance makes it impossible to elicit a judgement and 
consequent act of the will conceming an object which is unknown in its 
substance, error implies a false judgement concerning a known object 
which can lead to a false choice. Not every error of judgement, how-
ever, leads to a false choice, and in what concerns marriage, consent is 
vitiated only by that error which, as we shall see later, determines the 
will to choose a marriage deprived of an essential element. 
19. Of special interest for this en tire topie is the sentence c. ANNÉ dated March 11, 
1975 on a case initiated in Toronto. The Rotal Judges set aside the possible grounds of 
psychological incapacity because of the difficulties of proving the nullity of consent 
through the existence of a grave disorder of personality . They preferred to consider the act 
of consent itself and to argue the case under the subordinated caput of exclusio boni sacra-
menti by a positive act of the will (cfr. n.8). According to this sentence, the act of exclu-
sion followed necessarily from lack of due discretion and did not consist of an intent not to 
fulfill the marital obligations, but of a non-acceptance or disciaiming (infitiatio) of the 
same obligations by the act of consent itself (n.lO). The judges argued that such act of 
consent followed necessarily from an error «permeating the personality» (c . FELICE, 17-
XII-57), a «mentality» (c. HVOT, 1-VII-74; c . BEJAN, 23-IV-75), «attitude», «tempera-
men!», or «characteT» (c. FlORE, 14-VII-61; c. ANNÉ, 17-XII-74), (n. 9) affecting the 
subject of consent. «Because of extreme amorality, egotism, and consummate hedonism, 
men of this type lack discretion of judgement at the ethical plane (illa discretio iudicii, sub 
aspectu axiologico seu valorum ethicorum: cfr. n. 24) «regarding the marital rights and 
obligations to be mutually given and accepted» (cfr. n.10). As this sentence precedes the 
'83 Code, the judges seem to be arguing for a non-pathological moral incapacity described 
as «lack of discretion of judgement» . After the promulgation of c. 1095, «grave lack of 
discretion of judgement» ought to be limited to describe a «psychie» incapacity, while 
nonclinieal incapacitating conditions ought to be treated for the sake of ciarity under a 
different caput nullitatis. Cfr. also T.A.R.R., c. STANKIEWICZ, 23-VIT-82 in «Periodica» 72 
(1983), pp. 129-140 under the tille De s;mulatione totali consensus matrimonialis apud 
iuvenes qui vulgo «hippies» vocantur. 
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Ignorance, as a source of nullity of consent, is formulated by canon 
1096 which, determining the minimal knowledge needed to form an act 
of marriage consent, defines the substance of marriage as the consortium 
permanens inter virum et mulierem ordinatum ad prolem, cooperatione 
aliqua sexuali, procreandam. There can be no act of the will consenting 
to marriage without the knowledge that marriage consists of: 1) a part-
nership, or formalized common endeavour; 2) permanent and not transi-
tory; 3) between man and woman; 4) involving sorne sexual cooperation; 
5) for the purpose of procreation. 
Ignorance about the very substance of marriage after a person has 
reached puberty is very rare and, therefore, it should not be presumed, 
as explicitly stated in canon 1096. One can understand, however, that 
being raised under certain cultural influences, a person may not be suf-
ficientIy aware of the difference between consortium, or partnership in 
which the «partners» are bound to each other by sorne formal rights and 
obligations, from concubinage or «common law» marriage in which 
there is only a de Jacto permanent and sexual union between aman and a 
woman. 
In what refers to the other elements listed aboye, we ought to 
acknowledge that, it should be even more unusual for someone raised 
under the influence of a materialistic and secularized culture to remain 
ignorant, after adolescence, of the fact that procreation involves sexual 
intercourse and that marriage consists, therefore, of a permanent sexual 
relationship between man and woman for the purpose of procreation. 
But while ignorance about the substance of marriage might be even more 
unusual under the influence of our contemporary culture, this same cul-
ture fosters, as already mentioned, very grave etrors conceming the 
essential properties of marriage, and the ends to which marriage is 
directed by its own nature20, all of which are essential elements to be at 
least implicitIy present in the act of marriage consent. 
B. Error about the essential elements of marriage is identified by 
canonical doctrine as error iuris to distinguish it from error on the person 
or on the person's quality. As a caput nullitatis, this error iuris is 
regulated by canon 1099 in reference to unity, indissolubility and 
20. Cfr. c. 1055. 
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sacramental dignity with the concise statement that it «does not vitiate 
consent unless it determines the will», a formula which implicitly 
contains the doctrinal distinction between simple error which does not 
determine the will, and practical error which does determine the will21 . 
While canon 1099 formulates error iuris only in relation to the essential 
properties and to sacramental dignity, an error determining the will to 
exclude the essential ends of marriage, as specified in canon 1055, § 1, 
or the bona, which also belong to the essence of marriage, will also 
vitiate consent. 
In order to better understand the effect of error on the act of the will, 
we may recall that the practical judgement which forms the very act 
of consent is the conclusion, as it were, of a syllogism. The major 
premise of this syllogism is the speculative general judgement of the 
intellect stating that the permanent union 01' man and woman for the 
purpose of raising a family is a good to be desired and pursued. The 
minor premise is the particular judgement assessing the convenience, or 
value to oneself, of pursuing those goods with that particular persono 
The conclusion is then the practical judgement directing the will to 
choose that permanent union with that particular person in order to attain 
those goods. 
If the general judgement is in error concerning the substance of a 
particular object, no judgement can be formed beca use error in what 
refers to the substance of an object amounts to ignorance of the same 
object, and «nothing can be willed if not previously known». That 
would be the case, for instance, of someone who, not knowing that 
marriage implies a permanent relationship, thinks erroneously that it 
implies only a sexual relationship between man and woman. Since 
«permanence» belongs to the substance of marriage, the person ignoring 
it could not possibly form a judgement conceming a <<permanent partner-
ship» and the will, therefore, could not be motivated to choose what one 
does not know. 
But if the general and speculative judgement is in error about an 
element which does not define the object's substance, the same error can 
remain at the speculative level and not affect the particular judgement in 
21. Cfr. STANKIEWICZ, A., Errore circa le proprieta e la dignita sacramentale nel ma-
trimonio, «Monitor Ecc1esiasticus», 1984-I1I, pp. 470-486. 
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its assessment of the particular object to be chosen. A person, for 
instance, who knows that marriage in vol ves a permanent, non-transi-
tory, relation but who does not know that marriage is always indis-
soluble can still form a particular judgement about the desirability of 
marrying a certain person forever; the speculative error about indis-
solubility having played no part in the formation of the particular judge-
ment preceding consent. And this is so because the practical judgement 
forming the choice of the will is itself directly formed by the particular 
judgement assessing the value here and now of the object to be chosen, 
and only an error in this particular judgement will become an error which 
determines the will. 
When consent remains unaffected by the speculative error of the 
intellect, canonical doctrine calls this error «simple». «Simple error» 
exists in the case of the so-called «interpretative error» in which the per-
son chooses rightly in spite and because of the person's wrong interpre-
tation of an essential element of marriage. Titius, for example, married 
Caia with the clear intention of being her spouse forever. At that time, 
Titius did not know that he could never divorce. He is now certain that, 
had he known this at the time, he would not have married. Coming from 
an interpretation of past motives, that certainty is hypothetical because 
the fact remains that in spite of the error, and because of it, he rightly 
chose a true marriage: the error did not affect his actual will to marry that 
particular person forever and with no intention to divorce her. How can 
one choose both «unknowingly» and freely at the same time? Because 
the person, while mistaken about an essential element of marriage, had 
sufficient knowledge of its substance and was able to form a practical 
judgement unaffected by an error which remained at the speculative 
level. 
5. Error Pervicax 
But this also means that if the error at the speculative level enters 
into the practical judgement directing the will to choose, it becomes a 
practical error that determines the will. This occurs when the error first 
articulated in the general judgement of the intellect is so stubborn 
(pervicax) or deeply rooted (radicatus) that makes its way into the par-
ticular judgement which, assessing the value of the particular marriage to 
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be contracted, goes on to form the practical judgement which determines 
the choice of the will22. Caius, for example, erroneously and stubbornly 
thinks that, under certain circumstances, a person always retains the 
right to divorce -an error which, at this stage, remains at the speculative 
level of judgement. He wishes to marry Titia and is sincere in his desire 
of marrying her forever, even though he has had positive and serious 
doubts about the viability of the marriage: while he wishes to marry for-
ever and thinks that the marriage will be successful, he is assessing the 
value of the impending marriage with the erroneous assumption that 
should the doubts materialize, he does retain the right to divorce. At this 
stage, the error has entered into the particular judgement which, as-
sessing the convenience of his marriage with Titia, includes the right to 
divorce under certain circumstances. If it can be shown that this error 
played the role of a decisive argument in favor of contracting marriage, 
then it can be said that the practical judgment following the assessment 
includes a practical error directing the will to consent to a marriage de-
prived of indissolubility. Caius consented to a marriage dissoluble under 
certain circumstances -si casus ferat23• 
Notice that the pervicax error which determines the will is not the 
error concerning an hypothetical situation, but the error which i) is 
actually present in the particular judgement assessing the real situation of 
a marriage to be contracted, and ii) plays a decisive role in the favorable 
assessment of the same marriage. Only this error can be said to have 
entered the practical judgement which determines the will . 
Canonical doctrine is unanimous in upholding that a pervicax error 
determining the will to exclude an essential element of the object of con-
sent might be explicit or implicit24• Briefly this can be explained as 
follows: a) Error which determines the will is «explicit» when the person 
is aware of his or her error. Titius, for instance, holds that regardless of 
what the law of the Church requires, he still retains, under certain cir-
cumstances, a right to divorce. When this erroneous opinion is so stub-
22. Cfr. STANKIEWICZ. ibid. pp. 484; FELLHAVER. D .• The Exclusion of Indis· 
solubility: Old Principies and New Jurisprudence. «Studia Canonica». Vol. 9. No. 1 
(1975). pp. 105·133. 
23. Cfr. VILLEGGIANTE. S . in La Simulaz,ione .... ibid .• pp.212·217. 
24. Cfr. VILADRICH. P.J .• commentary to canon 1096 in «Código de Derecho Canó-
nico». Edición Anotada. Pamplona. 1983. 
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bom that it determines the will in its choice of the object, it necessarily 
takes the form of a «positive act of the will» excluding an essential ele-
ment of maniage from the act of consent. If this error is both explicit and 
so stubborn that it persists at the moment of giving consent, it becomes 
simulation as described by canon 1101, § 2. b) Error is «implicit:» when 
the person is not aware of his or her error conceming an essential ele-
ment of marriage: Caius, for instance, holds that he has a right to divorce 
Titia if she is not faithfuI, but he is not aware that this is an error. 
Laboring under such «implicit» error, Caius cannot elicit a «positive act 
of the will» toward that which he does not know. But if the error, while 
being only implicit in Caius' mind, is so stubborn as to constitute a firm 
and pervasive attitude Ieading him to marry Titia because he would not 
be bound if she were to be unfaithfuI, then Caius consent would be vi-
tiated by a «non-acceptance» or «disc1aimer» (infitiatio) of indis-
soIubility25. 
Pervicax error vitiates the act of marriage consent when, due to its 
«stubbomness», it determines the will to choose a marriage deprived of 
one of its essentiaI elements. But «stubbomness» will be differentIy 
proved depending on whether the error pervicax is explicit or implicit, 
thus determining the caput nullitatis and type of proof to be followed. As 
we have pointed out, when the error is explicit and the person is aware 
of what he or she is excIuding from the act of consent, the main proof of 
the nullity of consent will consist of those explicit statements showing 
the person's will to exc1ude marriage or one of its essential elements, in 
which case the appropriate caput nullitatis will be either total or partial 
«simulation». But if the error is implícit, the proof of nullity will have to 
be drawn from the person's deeds rather than the person's words, and 
the proper caput nullitatis should be error determinans which, being 
implicit but deeply rooted, «determines the will» to «di.sclaim» one of the 
essential elements in the act of maniage consent. 
6. Error Conceming the Formal Object ofConsent 
Whilc canons 1096 and 1099 help us distinguish between ignorance 
and error, the object of consent is more precisely determined from a 
25. Cfr. STANKIEWICZ, ibid. p. 485; c. ANNÉ, March ll, 1975 in footnote # 20. 
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careful reading of canons 1057, § 2, 1055, and 1056. Canon 1057, § 2 
explicitly states that the object of consent consists of the «giving and ac-
cepting of each other in order to form a marriage» which means, as in-
terpreted by canonical doctrine and jurisprudence, the mutual giving of 
the right over those very personal acts which we may call «spousal 
acts»26. 
When we give to another person a right over our actions, we give 
our free will over those actions, and since free will entails possession or 
mastery of self, by giving the right over those free acts we do, in fact, 
give ourselves. This is especially troe when the rights given refer to 
those very personal acts directed to the ends or purpose of marriage 
which, as formulated by canon 1055, are «the good of the spouses» and 
«the procreation and upbringing of off spring» . As these ends are to be 
pursued, as explicitly reiterated by canon J 056, in a partnership en-
dowed by the essential properties of unity and indissolubility, the rights 
exchanged at the moment of consent, through which the spouses « give 
and accept each othef», are the mutual, exclusive, perpetual, and irrevo-
cable 27 rights to: i) a «communion of life» or personal and complemen-
tary relationship between man and woman from which derive many acts 
of mutual help in the pursuit of the good of the spouses28; ii) a sexual 
relationship which, specifying the nature of that complementary relation-
ship, refers to sexual acts that are human and open to procreation; iii) 
demand from one's spouse the acceptance of offspring within the same 
26 . Canonical doctrine and forensic practice have traditionally used the bona as syn-
thetic formulations comprising all essential elements of the object of consent and as prac-
tical standards or measures of the validity or invalidity of marriage consent. More recently. 
the «good of the spouse» or tbe notion of communio vitae has been added as a fourtb stan-
dard. While acknowledging tbe practical value of this approach, we prefer to measure the 
validity of consent through the «error» concerning the essential rights and obligations 
forming the formal object of marriage consent. Sorne authors (e. g. J.M. SERRANO in La 
simulazione ... , ibid., pp. 95-124) speak of a ius ad consortium totius vitae which, princi-
pally and directly seeking «the good of the spouses», describes also the entire formal ob-
ject of consent. On our part we think it more helpful to reserve the term consortium 
(partnership) to identify the totality of marriage in lacto esse as a juridic relationship and 
speak rather of a communio vitae to refer to that fourth standard or of a ius ad commu-
nionem vitae to indicate the specific right wbich principally and directly refer~ to the 
«good of the spouses». 
27. Cfr. also C.I.C. canons 1134, 1135. 
28 . lus ad communionem vitae: cfr. VILADRICH, P.J. in "Código de Derecho Canó-
nico». Edición Anotada, commentary to c. 1095; FORNÉS, J., Derecho Matrimonial Can6-
nico, Madrid 1990, pp. 173 -174. 
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relationship -a right which, completing the specification of the same 
relationship, is exercised by the many acts of raising the children to their 
human development29. The right to demand the acceptance of off spring 
within the communio vitae potentially contains the many acts of raising 
the children, for by actually «receiving» offspring within their dynamic 
«communion of life and love»30, the spouses share with the children the 
gifts of their own life thus fulfilling the educational end of marriage. 
In defrning the essential rights and obligations, it is very important 
to keep in mind that the exchange of the right is essential for the validity 
of marriage in fieri, while the exercise of the right belongs to the practice 
of marriage in Jacto esse. The essential rights and obligations exchanged 
at the moment of consent are those stated before; the acts of mutual help, 
the human sexual acts open to procreation, and the many and diverse 
acts of raising the children to their human maturity belong to the practice 
of marriage. 
One can see that the «divorce mentality», the «contraceptive men-
tality», and the more general «mentality of selfism» which characterize 
our popular «culture» can bring about sorne very serious errors of 
judgement conceming the rights and obligations which ought to be given 
and accepted at the moment of consent When we speak of a «mentality» 
we refer to a set of notions directing a person's behavior, a complex of 
habitual «practical judgements», as it were, received from the so-
cio/cultural environment, generally accepted by the individual without 
much reflection, but directing a person's conduct even in sorne very 
fundamental things oflife31. 
In our days, and under the influence of the so-called «dissent men-
tality», sorne Catholics are quick to ignore the teaching authority of the 
Church on moral matters in favour of a morality shaped by the culture of 
secularism. While the marriage they wish to embrace might be in conflict 
with the teaching of the Church, they are not totaUy aware of their error 
29. For sorne specific essential rights and obligations identified by Rotal jurispru-
dc:mce, cfr. MENDONC;A, A., Antisocial Personalitv and Nullitv 01 Marriage, «Studia 
Canonica» 1982 (1), pp. 101-102. 
30. Cfr. JOHN PAUL n, Familiaris Consortio, n. 11 and Vatican 11, Gaudium et Spes, 
n. 48. 
31. POMPEDDA, M., uses the expression «pervasive error» to refer to such rnentali-
ties: cfr. Faith an the Sacrament 01 Marriage, «Marriage Studies» IV, ibid., p.5l. 
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because there is no question in their mind that they have a right to choose 
a marriage designed by their own ideas32. 
A. - Influenced, then, by these «mentalities», it is possible, at least 
theoretically, for someone to marry with the conviction that whatever 
rights one may acquire at marriage, these are not necessarily mutual. 
Under this error of judgement brought about by a strong «anti-commit-
ment mentality», a person may not inelude the very notion of consortium 
in the intended relationship33. Such a situation would represent a case of 
ignorance, or lack of knowledge of the very substance of marriage since, 
as explained before, the minimal knowledge of the substance of marriage 
should inelude the knowledge that marriage is a consortium permanens. 
More likely, however, a person of such radical mentality would be 
aware of what he or she is exeluding from the exchange of rights and 
corresponding obligations and would either choose concubinage or the 
simulation of marriage; in other words, a marriage contracted under error 
determinans would not be a likely outcome of such mentality34. 
B. - Under the influence of the «contraceptive mentality», a person 
may easily be in error about the fact that marriage consent implies the 
giving of the right to sexual acts that are human and «open to procre-
ation». While most people know, even if not articulately, that with mar-
riage one acquires a right to sexual acts with one's spouse, many people 
may in fact not know that this is a right to non-contraceptive sexual acts. 
Where the use of contraception has become prevalent and even con-
doned, if not encouraged, by sorne marriage preparation courses, the 
spouses may have entered into a marriage in which the use of non-con-
traceptive sexual acts is left to their future mutual agreement and is not 
implicitIy exchanged as a «right» at the moment of consent. 
The pretended «right to contraception», then, can constitute a per-
vicax error determining the will to a marriage consent devoid of an 
essential right and corresponding obligation. Canonical doctrine and 
32 . Cfr. S.R.R.D .• c. ANNÉ. ibid. n.l0. 
33 . Cfr. MONETA. P .• La simulazione totale, in «La simulazione» .. .. ibid .• p. 51 ; 
STANKIEWICZ. A .• De simulatione totali consensus matrimonialis .. . . «Periodica» 72 
(1983). pp. 129-140. 
34. Cfr. MONETA. P .• La simulazione tota/e. in «La simulazione» .... ibid .• pp. 51-53; 
DE LVCA. L.. L'esclusione del «bonum coniugum». ibid .• pp. 132-137. 
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Rotal jurisprudence unanimously agree that if the right to «sexual acts 
that are human and open to procreation» is exc1uded or in any way 
limited at the moment of consent, the marriage covenant is null. If only 
the use of the right is limited, it does not nullify marriage consent. In 
determining whether the right or the use has been affected, the following 
ought to be observed35: 
a) If the facts of the case prove that offspring were exc1uded com-
pletely, absolutely and permanently, one can presume that the right to 
non-contraceptive acts was exc1uded or not exchanged with the act of 
consent. 
b) If procreation was temporarily exc1uded or only the number of 
children was limited, it ought to be presumed that only the use of non-
contraceptive acts was limited at the moment of consent. 
Both presumptions admit, of course, contrary proof: one may be 
able to prove from the facts of the case that the stubborn error con-
ceming a pretended «right» to contraception did not in fact imply a denial 
of the spouses' lawful right to procreative acts; or one may be able to 
pro ve that the limitations on procreation conceming times and number of 
children did in fact represent a limitation of the right to non-contraceptive 
acts at the moment of consent. While not exc1uding an eventual agree-
ment to noncontraceptive sexual acts leading to procreation, a person 
may still faíl to give to the other, at the moment of consent, the right to 
those acts. 
The same «contraceptive mentality» can bring about a marriage con-
sent deprived of the giving to the other spouse the right to receive and 
raise offspring within the communio vitae between the spouses. This 
would be specially evident in the case of the woman who holds the mis-
taken belief that she has a «right to abortion». If she were to consent to 
marriage with such pervicax error, the validity of her consent would be 
gravely compromised, for it could involve an implicit but real denial of 
her spouse's right to receive offspring within the consortium or partner-
ship36 
35 . Cfr. RICCIARDI. G .• Procreazione responsabile ed esclusione del «bonum fidei». in 
«La simulazione» ...• ibid .• pp. 183-187. 
36. Cfr. STANKIEWICZ. A .• L'esclusione della procreazione ed educatione della prole. 
in «La Simulatione» ...• ibid .• p. 162. 
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The fact that an induced abortion might have occurred is not proof 
that the erroneous belief in a «right to abortion» necessarily detennined 
the will against the exchange of the right to receive children within the 
partnership. But if the facts of the case prove that procreation had totally 
been excluded or even limited, and that abortion had been used to totally 
avoid or limit procreation, one can draw a presumptio hominis that the 
right to receive children within the marital consortium was not included 
within the act of marriage consent, thus rendering consent null. Once 
again we should distinguish between the «right» exchanged at the mo-
ment of consent and the «exercise» of the right, for exclusion, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, of the right renders consent invalid, while actual 
failure to exercise the right is not in itself sufficient cause of nullity. 
C. - Under certain cultural influences, although perhaps not those 
that are predominant in the Western world, a person may en ter marriage 
with a deeply held error against unity by not knowing that the rights and 
obligations acquired with marriage consent are exclusive. That would be 
the case, for instance, of the man who contracts marriage not knowing 
that he does not have the right to have a concubine. While this error may 
be rare in our contemporary Western culture37, it may be more common 
for someone, who is aware of the exclusive character of the rights ex-
changed, to knowingly exclude unity, in which case we would be 
dealing with explicit error and exclusion through «a positive act of the 
will» (i.e. simulation) but not with implicit error «determining the 
will»38. 
D. - The «divorce mentality» may al so bring about an invalidating 
error conceming the indissolubility of marriage and the perpetual and ir-
revocable character of the rights and obligations exchanged with mar-
riage consent. A person who stubbornly holds a «right to divorce under 
certain circumstances» may be repudiating the property of indissolubility 
or the perpetual and irrevocable character of the rights given, in which 
case, marriage consent would be invalido As already explained, a deeply 
37. A Rotal decision of 23-IV -75 c. BEJAN, found that nullity had been proved, tum 
singulari forma mentis".tum praesertim pluribus factis, in lhe marriage of a Moslem who 
consented to a bond deprived of unity and indissolubility (cited in ANNE'S, ibid., n. 9). 
38. Cfr. FuNGHINI, R., L'esclusione del «bonulII fidei» in «La simulatione»". , ibid., 
p. 146. 
554 1. GRAMUNT-L.A. WAUCK 
rooted error determining the will against indissolubility should be pre-
sent in the particular judgement assessing the marriage to be contracted 
as a ratio contrahendi, or determining factor for contracting the same 
marriage. 
7. Error conceming sacramentality 
As we read in canon 1055, § 2, between two baptized persons there 
can be no valid marriage which is not at the same time a sacrament. In 
recent times, under the influence of a secularized culture and for a great 
variety of personal reasons, sorne baptized non-believers may still con-
tract marriage according to the rite of the Church. Their lack of faith, 
however, raises important questions concerning the validity of their 
marriage which are the topic of recent canonical studies and of sorne 
Rotal decisions39• Lack of faith in the sacrament is not an impediment 
for its valid reception and it is not a source of nullity of marriage because 
the sacramentality of marriage depends on the person's baptismal charac-
ter, a supematural reality not subject to the changes of human will40, and 
on the integrity of the natural reality which is the sign of the sacrament: 
given the integrity of the sign, marriage between two baptized persons is 
raised by the Lord to the dignity of sacrament41 • 
The Church teaches that marriage, which is different from all the 
other sacraments because it is «part of the very economy of Creation», is 
the sacrament of the «conjugal covenant» instituted by the Creator «from 
the beginning». «Therefore, the decision of man and woman ... to 
commit by their irrevocable consent their whole lives in indissoluble love 
an unconditional fidelity» implies an attitude of profound obedience to 
the will of God «which cannot exist without God's grace». And since 
marriage «is also a social matter, committing the couple being married in 
the eyes of society», even when a couple's motives for marrying in 
church are more social than religious, they still «implicity consent to 
39. Cfr. POMPEDDA, M., Faith and the Sacrament of Marriage - Lack of Faith and 
Matrimonial Consent: Juridical Aspects, in «Marriage Studies,. IV, CLSA, Washington, 
1990, pp. 51-64; MONETA, P., La simulazione totale, ibid., pp. 45-56. 
40. JOHN P AUL II explains that those «engaged couples are already sharers, by virtue 
of their baptism, in Christ's marriage covenant with the Church,.: cfr. Familiaris 
Consortio, n. 68. 
41. Cfr. c. 1055, § 1. 
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what the Church intends todo». In preparing the couple to be married, 
the pastor's mission is to make this attitude explicit and more perfect 42. 
The doctrinal principIes implied in this teaching apply also to non-
Catholic Christians who, not subject to the canonical form, have validly 
married in a civil or religious ceremony43. 
A person, then, whose consent is formed by a mistaken judgement 
conceming the sacramentality of marriage between two baptized per-
sons, or whose particular judgement concerning marriage does not even 
include a vague notion of its natural sacredness will choose, in most 
cases, to enter into an exclusive and permanent partnership for the good 
of the spouses and the raising of children. But if the error is such that it 
determines the will to exclude not just marriage's supematural significa-
tion, but one of the natural elements which make up the sign, then that 
error nullifies consent. This can happen with those whose «mentality» is 
so radicalized that their intention «not to do what the Church does» goes 
beyond the Church's sacramental teaching to reject also its teaching 
about the natural elements which form the essence of the sacramental 
sign, and they thus wish a marriage devoid of a juridic bond, or of the 
essential rights and obligations which make up this bond, or of its unity 
and indissolubility 44. As we have been explaining aH along, this rejec-
tion of the essential elements which make up the natural sign can be ex-
plicit or implicit. If explicit, we would have a case of «simulation»; if 
implicit, a case of error determinans. 
8. Proof of Error Determining the Will 
In these pages we have been trying to show the difference between 
the «grave defect of discretion of judgement» and «error iuris» for, as 
we explained, the truthful and just outcome of the canonical process de-
pends on the clear definition of the caput nullitatis. We have also distin-
guished between explicit and implicit error. When the error is explicit in 
42 . Cfr. JOHN PAUL n, ¡bid. 
43. The Pope waens that the attempt to lay down further criteria for the level of faith 
required for the celebration of baptism can lead, among other risks, to questioning the 
sacramental nature of many marriages of baptized nonCatholics, which would be contraey 
to eccIesial tradition: cfr. ibid. 
44 . Cfr. HERV ADA, J., Esencia del matrimonio y consentimiento Matrimonial, in 
«Persona y Derecho», 9 (1982), pp. 149-179. 
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the sense that the person is aware of what he or she is excluding from 
the act of consent, the main body of evidence wiU come from those ver-
bal statements which show a person's positive act of the will excluding 
an essential element of marriage. In this case, then, the appropriate caput 
nullitatis will be either total or partial «simulation» as formulated in 
canon 11Ol. But if the error is implícit, the proof of invalid consent will 
have to be drawn from those deeds (rather than words) which show a 
deeply rooted error determining the will to choose a marriage deprived of 
one of its essential elements. The proper caput nullitatis will then be 
«error determining the will». 
This «determining error» will have to be proven by: 
a) A consistent pattern of behavior showing a «mentality» not in 
conformity with those goods or values implied in the essential elements 
of marriage. If this consistent pattem of behavior can be proved and then 
shown to be the logical outcome of the person's background, education, 
or prevalent influences in his or her environment, one may begin to pre-
sume that the error is deeply rooted. 
b) Verbal statements showing sorne of the practical consequences of 
a mentality contrary to the values implied in the essential elements al-
legedly absent from the act of consent. The provative value of these 
statements will have to be weighed by the particular circumstances of 
each case. If, for example, a couple express their mutual and exclusive 
lo ve for each other with a threat that, should they be unfaithful they 
would divorce, these words, with all their negative and mistaken no-
tions, may not express an intention against indissolubility but a will to be 
forever faithful to each other. But if the threat is such that it originates 
from a positive doubt conceming the tmth of their commitment (because 
during the time of their engagement one or the other had, in fact, been 
unfaithful), then the threat is, more likely, an expression of a consent 
deprived of indissolubility. 
c) The report of a psychological expert showing the stubbomess and 
pervasiveness of the error by the ingrained traits and other psychological 
influences in the person under investigation. Since error iuris becomes 
error determinans when it is so deeply rooted or stubbom as to constitute 
«a second nature», as jurisprudence has diversely identified it45, this re-
45. Cfr. S.R.R.O. 26-I1I-56, c. FILlPIAK; 17-I1I-59, c. FELlCI; 8-VI-68, c. FAGGlOLO. 
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port can be very helpful in establishing the proof. When the stubborness 
of the error has been sufficientIy established, then it can be presumed 
with moral certainty that the error entered into the practical judgement 
thus determining the will to choose a marriage deprived of an essential 
element. 
The importance of defining the caput nullitatis as clearly as possible 
is underlined by the notion of «autonomous» caput nullitatis. Since all 
capita nullitatis refer to the «act of the will to form a marriage», they are 
related, at least indirectIy, to one another making it possible for different 
allegations of invalid consent to be proven by the same set of facts. At 
the same time, a ground of nullity is said to be «autonomous» when it 
requires its own type of evidence and its own line of investigation, a 
thing that ought to be determined at that early stage of the canonical pro-
cess known as the «determination of the doubt». At the moment when 
the judges agree that the alleged nullity may be proved through one or 
several capita nullitatis, it is especially important to know in what sense 
the grounds chosen are «autonomous» and to what extent they may be 
mutually incompatible. 
In these pages we have dealt with three autonomous capita: «grave 
defect of discretion of judgement», «implicit error determining the will», 
and «simulation» which are related to each other as follows: 
a) «Grave defect of discretion of judgement» and «error determining 
the will» are autonomous grounds of nullity but not mutually exclusive. 
They can be proposed as alternative grounds: should «incapacity» (c. 
1095, § 2) not be proved by the available evidence, «determining errOf» 
(c. 1099) may be pro ved by the same evidence. 
It may be of interest to note that the testimony of the psychological 
expert will be of different value in the case of incapacity and in the case 
of error. In the latter case, as already explained, a psychological profile 
of the person involved can serve to show the «stubbornness» of the 
error and only indirectIy and secondarily, the inadequacy of the judge-
ment which forms the act of consent. In cases of «consensual inca-
pacity», however, the testimony of the psychological expert will serve to 
prove directIy and principally the factual incapacity to elicit that discrimi-
nating and discerning particular judgement needed for valid consent. 
b) «Grave defect of discretion of judgement» (c. 1095, § 2) is not 
compatible, however, with «simulation» (c. 1101). The very concept of 
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simulation requires awareness of what the person is excluding with a 
«positive aet of the will». Sinee one eannot simulate what one eannot 
diseem, it would be eontradietory to attempt to prove either one of these 
two eapita with the same evidenee. 
e) It may also be said that «error determining the will» Ce. 1099) and 
«simulation» Ce. 1101) are not compatible, for one eannot simulate what 
one does not know beeause of error. But as we have shown, the use of 
one or the other caput nullitatis may depend on whether the error is im-
plieit, thus determining the will to implicitIy «disclaim» or «non-aceept», 
or explicit, thus originating a «positive aet» of exclusion. The latter will 
be best proved by explicit expressions of the person's intentions to ex-
elude; the former will be pro ved by deeds, rather than by words, 
showing a deeply-rooted «mentality» and a will implicitly but firmly set 
to «non-aeeept» or «disclaim». One can see then that in actual praetiee, a 
set of faets whieh may not direetIy pro ve a positive aet of the will to ex-
elude may indirectly prove an implieit but stubbom error determining the 
will to disclaim or repudiate46. These two eapita, then, can be proposed 
subordinately: if simulation is not proved, error determinans may be 
proved. 
By way of eonclusion, we may add that as nature itself inclines the 
human person to marriage47, the hypothesis of real incapaeity to eonsent 
to marriage is to be considered only when, in words of John Paul 11, «an 
anomaly of a serious natUfe is present whieh, however it may be 
defined, must substantially vitiate the eapaeity to understand and/or to 
eonsent»48. Similarly, the hypothesis of implieit repudation of an 
essential element in the aet of marriage eonsent, is to be eonsidered only 
when the person's behavior has been gravely and eonsistentIy eontrary 
to any of those values eontained in the essential elements of marriage. 
And for sueh hypothesis to beeome moral eertainty, the evidenee ought 
to be arrayed to prove that eonsent was pre-determined by a grave and 
deeply rooted error to ehoose something other than marriage. 
46. Cfr. DEL AMO, L., Commentary to c. 1525 in «Código de Derecho Canónico», 
Pamplona 1983, p. 919. 
47. Cfr. S.Th., Supl. q. 41, arto 1. 
48 . Cfr. JOHN PAUL 11, Address to the Rota, Febr. 5, 1987, n.7. 
